

Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism

Introduction: The Enduring Enigma of Skepticism

In a world awash with conflicting opinions, polarized debates, and ceaseless streams of information, the ancient quest for certainty has never felt more urgent—or more elusive. Yet, long before the age of social media and fake news, a Greek philosopher named Sextus Empiricus offered a radical solution: embrace uncertainty. His masterwork, **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism**, remains one of the most influential and challenging texts in the history of Western philosophy. This comprehensive guide explores the life, ideas, and lasting impact of this remarkable work, unpacking its core concepts and revealing why it continues to resonate with modern readers seeking clarity in a confusing world.

Who Was Sextus Empiricus?

Very little is known about Sextus Empiricus himself. He was a physician and philosopher who likely lived in the late second century CE, probably in Alexandria or Rome. His name suggests he belonged to the Empiric school of medicine, which emphasized observation and experience over theoretical dogma. This medical background profoundly shaped his philosophical outlook. For Sextus, philosophy was not an abstract game but a practical therapy for the mind—a way to achieve tranquility (ataraxia) by untangling the knots of dogmatic belief.

His principal surviving works are *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (often cited as *PH* from the Greek *Pyrrhōneioi Hypotypōseis*) and a longer work titled *Against the Mathematicians* (or *Adversus Mathematicos*). The **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** is his most systematic and accessible exposition of Pyrrhonian skepticism, named after the earlier philosopher Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE). Pyrrho is traditionally considered the founder of this skeptical tradition, but it was Sextus who provided its definitive formulation.

Unpacking the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*

What Is Pyrrhonian Skepticism?

Pyrrhonian skepticism is often misunderstood as mere doubt or denial. In fact, it is a much subtler and more profound philosophical stance. According to Sextus, the skeptic is not someone who asserts that nothing can be known (that would be a dogmatic claim in itself). Rather, the skeptic is someone who continues to investigate, *suspends judgment* when faced with conflicting evidence, and achieves peace of mind as a result.

The **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** opens with a clear definition: *"Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquility."* This passage encapsulates the entire project. The skeptic's skill (*dynamis*) lies in systematically opposing one appearance or argument against another until they appear equally balanced. This "equipollence" leads to *epochē*—a suspension of belief or disbelief. And that suspension, paradoxically, brings *ataraxia*—tranquility or undisturbedness.

The Ten Modes of Suspension

One of the most famous sections of the **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** is the presentation of the Ten Modes (or Tropes) of suspension of judgment. These are rhetorical strategies designed to show that for any claim we might make about how things really are, we can find equally compelling reasons to doubt it. The modes cover a wide range of human experience:

- **Mode 1:** Differences among animals. What tastes delicious to a dog might be revolting to a human. Who is to say which perception is correct?
- **Mode 2:** Differences among humans. Even within our own species, people disagree about what is pleasant, useful, or true. Which person should we trust?
- **Mode 3:** Differences among the senses. A painting looks three-dimensional to the eyes but feels flat to the touch. Which sense reveals the true nature?
- **Mode 4:** Circumstances and conditions. The same water feels hot to a cold hand and cold to a hot hand. The same food tastes different when we are healthy versus sick.
- **Mode 5:** Positions, intervals, and places. A tower looks round from a distance but square up close. A stick appears bent in water but straight out of water.
- **Mode 6:** Admixtures. We never perceive anything pure—air, light, moisture, and our own sense organs always mix with the object. So we never see the thing itself.
- **Mode 7:** Quantities and constitutions. A small amount of wine strengthens us; a large amount weakens us. Is wine strengthening or weakening? It depends on quantity.
- **Mode 8:** Relativity. Everything is relative to a perceiver, a context, and a framework. There is no absolute "hot" or "cold."
- **Mode 9:** Frequency or rarity. The first earthquake terrifies us; after many, we become indifferent. The same event appears extraordinary or ordinary depending on frequency.
- **Mode 10:** Customs, laws, and beliefs. What is considered just in one culture is unjust in another. No custom can be universally validated.

The beauty of these modes is not that they prove the world is unknowable, but that they equip the skeptic with a toolkit for countering any dogmatic assertion. They do not aim at truth but at *isostheneia*—equal strength of arguments.

The Five Modes of Agrippa

In addition to the Ten Modes, Sextus also discusses the five modes attributed to Agrippa, which are more logically focused. These modes target the structure of dogmatic reasoning itself:

1. **Disagreement:** Every question has unresolved disagreement among philosophers.
2. **Regress ad infinitum:** Any proof offered for a claim requires another proof, leading to an infinite chain.
3. **Relativity:** As in Mode 8 above, all things appear relative.
4. **Hypothesis:** Dogmatists often simply assume an unproven starting point to stop the regress, but this is

arbitrary.

5. **Circularity:** Claims and proofs often rely on each other in a vicious circle.

These five modes demonstrate that any attempt to ground knowledge in absolute certainty is doomed to fail. For the Pyrrhonian skeptic, the only rational response is to suspend judgment about all non-evident matters.

The Therapeutic Dimension of Pyrrhonism

One of the most compelling aspects of the **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** is its explicit therapeutic goal. Sextus compares the skeptic to a doctor who administers different remedies for different ailments. Dogmatism itself is seen as a kind of mental disease—an anxiety caused by the relentless pursuit of certainty and the frustration that follows when it remains out of reach. By learning to suspend judgment, the skeptic achieves a state of mental peace.

Importantly, Sextus insists that the skeptic can still live an ordinary life. They are not paralyzed by doubt. They follow appearances (*phainomena*)—the way things seem—as a practical guide. They eat when hungry, avoid pain, and follow the customs of their society, all without believing that these appearances reveal the true nature of reality. This is the famous Pyrrhonian "way of life" (*agōgē*), which allows the skeptic to function while maintaining intellectual humility.

Criticisms and Misinterpretations

Throughout history, **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** has been attacked from many angles. Critics argue that a life of total suspension is impossible—how can one decide anything? Sextus responds that the skeptic does decide, but only according to appearance, not according to a claim about objective truth. Others claim that Pyrrhonism is self-refuting: if you say "all claims are equally balanced," that claim itself must be balanced against its opposite, thus undermining itself. Sextus accepts this charge with equanimity, describing skepticism as a "laxative that purges itself along with everything else." It is not a doctrine but a practice.

Moreover, there is a long-standing debate about whether Sextus was a "urbane" (moderate) skeptic or a "rustic" (radical) one. Did he suspend judgment about everything, including everyday appearances? The text suggests he did not suspend about appearances themselves—only about what lies behind them. This nuanced reading has kept scholars debating for centuries.

The Legacy of *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*

Revival in the Renaissance and Early Modern Era

After being largely forgotten in the medieval period, the **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** was rediscovered in the 15th century and published in Latin translation in 1562. It had an explosive impact on early modern philosophy. Michel de Montaigne, in his *Apology for Raymond Sebond*, used Sextus's arguments to question human reason. René Descartes's famous project of radical doubt was, in part, a response to the

skeptical challenge posed by Sextus. Descartes wanted to find a foundation for knowledge that could not be shaken by Pyrrhonian arguments. Ironically, many argue that Descartes ended up reviving skepticism rather than defeating it.

David Hume's empiricism also owes a debt to Sextus. Hume's critique of causality and induction echoes the skeptical modes, though Hume himself was not a full Pyrrhonian. In the 20th century, philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty have drawn on Pyrrhonian themes to challenge foundationalist epistemology.

Modern Relevance: A Tool for Critical Thinking

Today, **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** speaks directly to our information-saturated age. The Ten Modes are a ready-made antidote to confirmation bias, echo chambers, and polarized discourse. They remind us that we rarely have access to "the whole truth" and that our perceptions are filtered through countless variables—biology, culture, language, context. By learning to suspend judgment, we become more open to multiple perspectives and less susceptible to manipulation.

In fields like cognitive science and psychology, the concept of "cognitive dissonance" echoes the discomfort that Sextus described as the result of dogmatic attachment. His therapeutic approach prefigures modern mindfulness practices, where non-attachment to thoughts leads to mental calm. Moreover, the skeptical method is a foundational tool for scientific inquiry: test hypotheses, look for counter-evidence, remain open to revision.

A Practical Guide to Pyrrhonian Living

How can a modern reader apply the insights of the **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** without becoming a full-fledged skeptic? Consider these everyday practices:

- **Embrace equipollence:** Before adopting a strong opinion on a controversial topic, actively seek out the strongest arguments on the opposing side until both sides seem equally plausible. You may find that your initial certainty dissolves into a productive state of inquiry.
- **Follow appearances:** When you need to make a practical decision—what to eat, which route to take—simply follow what seems best at the moment, without claiming that it is *truly* the best. This reduces anxiety about making the "perfect" choice.
- **Cultivate detachment:** Recognize that your beliefs about politics, religion, and morality are often the result of accidental circumstances—where you were born, what you were taught. This awareness can foster humility and reduce conflict.
- **Use the modes as mental checklists:** When someone presents a claim as absolute certainty, run through the Ten Modes quickly: Could this be because of their upbringing? Their mood? Their sensory limitations? You will find that few claims survive unscathed.

Conclusion: The Tranquility of Not Knowing

The **Sextus Empiricus Outlines Of Pyrrhonism** is far more than a historical curiosity. It is a living philosophical resource